If you want to understand the high cost of proliferation financing, this story will help
It’s a classic proliferation financing story: Three criminals, millions in illegal profits and a trail of US technology found inside Russian missiles and drones.
The story starts with Nikolay Goltsev, Kristina Puzyreva, and Salimdzhon Nasriddinov who thought they had the perfect scheme that involved laundering money, falsifying records and smuggling high-tech electronics to Russia’s military. But eagle-eyed bankers, some due diligence and the criminal’s own text messages ultimately ensured a prison cell for an ending
Goltsev, a Canadian national with a deep understanding of export control laws, was the group’s mastermind and the architect of the effort to evade sanctions. From Brooklyn, he used two front companies, SH Brothers Inc. and SN Electronics Inc., to buy and ship millions of dollars’ worth of restricted electronics.
His method was simple but effective:
✅ Buy electronic components from US manufacturers under false pretenses.
✅ Route shipments through intermediary countries such as Turkey, Hong Kong, India, China, and the UAE to obscure their final destination.
✅ Smuggle them into Russia, where they were integrated into military hardware used in Ukraine
The scale grew to over $7 million worth of high-tech components sent straight into Russia’s war machine. But apparently Goltsev wasn’t just in it for the money. His own messages reveal his unwavering support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Goltsev’s wife, Puzyreva, played a crucial role in the operation by laundering the dirty money and ensuring the illegal business could keep running smoothly.
Nasriddinov helped execute the operation by purchasing restricted electronics and arranging their illegal shipment.
How They Got Caught
For years, the operation ran smoothly. Here’s how law enforcement took them down:
Suspicious financial transactions – Banks flagged wire transfers routed through multiple countries, triggering red flags under anti-money laundering (AML) laws.
Fake companies, false documents – Investigators uncovered discrepancies in end-user certificates meant to disguise Russian military buyers.
Export control investigations – The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) found unauthorized shipments of high-risk technology.
International intelligence sharing – Agencies like the FBI and Homeland Security worked with global partners to track the smuggling network.
Undercover operations – Informants and surveillance likely played a role in gathering evidence.
When authorities eventually raided Goltsev’s New York hotel room, they seized $20,000 in cash. In total, $1.68 million has been confiscated in connection with the scheme.
The fallout
✅ Nikolay Goltsev – Sentenced to 40 months in federal prison.
✅ Kristina Puzyreva – Sentenced to 24 months for money laundering.
✅ Salimdzhon Nasriddinov – Awaiting sentencing.
The Bigger Picture: Cracking down on proliferation financing
This case was part of a broader crackdown led by the Disruptive Technology Strike Force, a Justice and Commerce Department initiative targeting illicit tech transfers, and the Task Force KleptoCapture, which focuses on enforcing sanctions and economic restrictions against Russia.
US Attorney Breon Peace is quoted as saying: “Russia cannot effectively manufacture advanced weapons without US technology. Today’s sentence goes a long way in preventing Russia’s access to US electronics for use in the unlawful war against Ukraine.”
The red flags
Several indicators could have alerted authorities and businesses to the illicit nature of this operation:
- Use of shell companies: The rapid establishment of multiple corporate entities in Brooklyn with no clear operational history or legitimate business activities is suspicious.
- Complex shipping routes: The involvement of multiple intermediary countries in the shipping process, especially those known for transshipment, is a common tactic to obscure final destinations.
- Misrepresentation of end-users: Providing false or misleading information about the ultimate recipients of the goods, particularly when dealing with dual-use items, is a significant red flag.
- High-risk destinations: The final destination being Russia, especially entities associated with its military, should have prompted enhanced due diligence given existing sanctions.
- Unusual payment patterns: The use of various bank accounts and financial transactions that do not align with standard business practices may indicate attempts to launder money or evade detection.
Preventive Measures
To mitigate the risk of such schemes, businesses and authorities can implement the following strategies:
- Enhanced due diligence: Companies should thoroughly vet new clients and partners, especially those involving high-risk jurisdictions or industries.
- Monitoring complex supply chains: Establish robust tracking mechanisms to monitor the flow of goods, particularly when multiple intermediaries are involved.
- Employee training: Regularly train staff to recognize red flags associated with sanctions evasion and export control violations.
- Collaboration with authorities: Maintain open lines of communication with regulatory bodies and promptly report suspicious activities.
- Utilization of technology: Employ advanced software solutions to screen transactions and partners against updated sanctions lists and to detect anomalies in trade patterns.
By adopting these measures, businesses can better protect themselves from inadvertently participating in illicit activities and contribute to the broader effort of enforcing international sanctions and export controls.
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