A US agricultural supply-chain company has agreed to pay more than $10 million after customs brokers used by the business paid bribes to Mexican officials to move trainloads of goods across the US-Mexico border.
On 17 July, the US Department of Justice announced that the Scoular Company had entered into a three-year deferred prosecution agreement over a scheme involving shipments of corn and other agricultural products. Scoular agreed to pay a criminal penalty of $9,769,521 and forfeit a further $414,351.
At the centre of the case were payments described as “reinspection fees”. According to the Department of Justice, they were actually reimbursements for bribes paid by customs brokers to Mexican officials.
The case is a warning for any organisation relying on intermediaries to manage customs, licensing, inspections or other interactions with public officials. A payment does not become legitimate because it appears on an invoice, is described as a local fee or is made through a third party.
How the bribery scheme worked
Between 2013 and 2019, Scoular used customs brokers to help its rail shipments enter Mexico. Mexican authorities inspected the shipments for dirt, soil and other impurities, which could result in delays, additional treatment requirements or other costs.
To ensure that trains cleared the border despite adverse inspection findings, Scoular employees authorised customs brokers to make payments to Mexican officials. The brokers reportedly paid approximately $2,000 for each train and then invoiced Scoular for reimbursement using descriptions such as “reinspection fees”. Communications about the shipments and payments took place through WhatsApp and other channels.
Over the course of the scheme, more than $400,000 was paid in bribes, while Scoular avoided over $6.5 million in fees and costs.
The case did not involve one enormous, unmistakably suspicious transfer. It involved repeated payments that could be presented as ordinary operating costs and absorbed into the normal movement of goods.
That is often how corporate bribery risk develops. A business encounters an obstacle. A local intermediary offers a solution. A vaguely described charge appears on an invoice. Once the payment succeeds in avoiding a delay, it becomes part of the process.
A third party does not shield the business
Customs brokers, freight forwarders and local agents can provide essential expertise, particularly when a company is working across multiple legal systems. They can also create significant bribery exposure because they operate between the company and government officials.
The use of an intermediary does not automatically distance an organisation from a corrupt payment. In this case, the Department of Justice said the brokers acted at the direction of Scoular employees and for Scoular’s benefit.
This is significant because it demonstrates that companies should not limit their anti-bribery controls to payments made directly by employees. They must also understand what agents, distributors and other service providers are doing on their behalf.
Invoices deserve particular attention. Descriptions such as “special handling”, “local processing” or “reinspection” may refer to genuine services. However, unexplained round-number payments, repeated charges linked to successful government approvals or fees unsupported by official documentation should be challenged.
The description used in the accounting system will not determine whether a payment is a bribe. Investigators will examine what the payment was intended to achieve, who ultimately received it and what the company knew or should have recognised from the surrounding circumstances.
The cartel connection increased the stakes
The Department of Justice said that some of the payments ultimately benefited people associated with the operations of a cartel at the US-Mexico border, although Scoular and its employees were reportedly unaware of that connection.
This allowed US prosecutors to frame the case as more than a corporate bribery matter. They argued that corrupt payments connected with cross-border trade can also support organised crime and threaten national security. For businesses operating in regions where organised criminal groups exert influence ignorance of the final destination of a payment may provide limited comfort.
Companies need risk assessments that consider the wider operating environment, not only whether a third party has appeared on a sanctions or enforcement database. This includes understanding where a service provider operates, which officials it interacts with, whether it uses subcontractors and whether criminal organisations are known to influence the relevant trade routes or government processes.
The relevance for UK businesses
UK organisations should not treat the Scoular resolution as a distant US enforcement story.
Under the Bribery Act 2010, a commercial organisation can commit an offence when a person associated with it bribes another person intending to obtain or retain business, or an advantage in the conduct of business. The organisation has a defence if it can demonstrate that it had adequate procedures designed to prevent such conduct.
An associated person is broadly defined as someone performing services for or on behalf of the organisation. Depending on the circumstances, this can include employees, agents, subsidiaries and other intermediaries. A customs broker paying officials to prevent delays or avoid costs could therefore create direct exposure for the business benefiting from the payment.
The Act also has significant international reach. UK-incorporated businesses can face exposure for bribery committed abroad, while overseas companies carrying on part of their business in the UK may also fall within the corporate failure-to-prevent offence.
There is also no general UK exemption for facilitation payments. Payments made to persuade an official to perform a routine function can amount to bribes, even where such payments are considered customary locally. Genuine, legally required administrative charges or official fast-track fees may be permitted, but they should be transparent, documented and paid through authorised channels.
Could this happen inside your supply chain?
A business does not need to operate trains across the Mexican border to face similar risks.
Comparable situations can arise when an intermediary promises to accelerate a visa, release goods from a port, secure a permit, overlook an inspection failure, reduce a tax assessment or arrange access to a government customer.
The first step is to identify where the organisation depends on third parties to interact with public officials. This should include the departments commissioning the service, the employees approving the payments and the finance teams processing the invoices.
Due diligence should then reflect the actual risk. A basic company registration check may be insufficient for a customs broker operating in a high-risk location. The business may need to understand the broker’s ownership, reputation, government connections, subcontracting arrangements and proposed fee structure.
That scrutiny should continue after onboarding. A provider that passed due diligence three years ago may change ownership, begin using new subcontractors or introduce unexplained fees. Monitoring payment data and reviewing the relationship periodically can identify changes that an initial questionnaire will miss.
The purpose of payments
The Scoular case demonstrates why anti-bribery compliance cannot sit entirely with the legal or compliance team.
Accounts payable staff may be among the first people able to identify suspicious descriptions, duplicate charges, missing supporting documents or payments that fall just below approval thresholds. Logistics and procurement teams may notice that a broker consistently solves regulatory problems unusually quickly. Employees working directly with the intermediary may hear references to unofficial payments or “how things are done locally”.
These employees need clear escalation routes and the confidence to use them. They should understand that asking questions about an invoice is part of their role, rather than an accusation against a colleague or supplier.
Businesses should also examine how decisions are recorded. In the Scoular scheme, employees reportedly discussed shipments and payments through WhatsApp. Messaging platforms can support efficient international operations, but they can also create fragmented records outside formal approval systems. Policies should explain which channels may be used for business decisions and how relevant communications must be retained.
Training should reflect real-world risks
A general statement that bribery is prohibited will not necessarily help an employee decide whether an unfamiliar customs charge is legitimate.
Training should address realistic situations employees encounter, including requests for unofficial payments, unexplained fees from brokers, pressure to approve urgent invoices and claims that a payment is necessary to avoid disruption.
Different roles will require different emphasis. Procurement teams need to recognise third-party warning signs. Finance teams should understand suspicious payment structures. Managers need to know how to respond when a team reports that refusing a payment could delay an important shipment.
The objective is to give employees enough understanding to pause, question and escalate before the organisation becomes committed to a corrupt arrangement.
Cooperation reduced the penalty, but self-reporting came too late
The Department of Justice said Scoular did not receive voluntary disclosure credit because it did not report the conduct voluntarily and promptly.
However, the company received credit for cooperating with investigators and taking remedial action. The final criminal penalty was reduced by 25% from the bottom of the applicable guidelines range.
The lesson for UK businesses is that finding a problem should trigger a carefully managed response. Relevant records must be preserved, the potential scope of the misconduct should be assessed and legal advice should be obtained before taking steps that could compromise an investigation.
The SFO’s corporate cooperation guidance states that a prompt self-report and full cooperation will normally lead to an invitation to negotiate a deferred prosecution agreement rather than prosecution, unless exceptional circumstances apply. Companies that fail to self-report may still be considered for a DPA where their subsequent cooperation is exemplary, but they begin from a weaker position.
The real warning?
The payments in this case were not hidden behind a sophisticated offshore structure. They were passed through service providers, placed on invoices and presented as costs associated with moving goods across a border.
That apparent ordinariness is precisely what makes the case relevant.
Companies should test whether their controls can identify corrupt payments when they look like everyday business expenses. They should know which third parties interact with officials, require evidence for unusual charges and make sure employees understand that local custom does not override anti-bribery law.
Policies and contractual clauses are important, but they must be supported by due diligence, monitoring, financial controls, meaningful reporting routes and training that reflects real decisions. Effective training can help organisations move from having a policy on paper to preventing questionable payments before they become established business practice.
