Sun, sea and subterfuge: Former premier of Turks and Caicos guilty of bribery

The conviction of Michael Misick, the former premier of the Turks and Caicos Islands, brings to a close one of the longest and most complex corruption cases in the modern history of a British Overseas Territory. After more than a decade of investigations, delays, and fractured proceedings, the court found Misick guilty of multiple offences of bribery committed while he was in office, alongside convictions for money laundering against close political and personal associates.

The conviction of Michael Misick is a reminder that bribery involving foreign officials can be large-scale, long-running, and deeply embedded in legitimate-looking commercial activity and deeply connected to Politically Exposed Persons.

PEPs must always be treated as high risk and this includes their associates, who should not be treated as an afterthought. Where public power, private money, and complex structures intersect, the cost of getting onboarding and monitoring wrong can run into tens of millions and reputational damage can last far longer.

A decade-long corruption case reaches its conclusion

On 4 February 2026, Justice Rajendra Narine delivered a judge-only verdict finding Michael Misick guilty of three counts of bribery linked to large-scale land and tourism developments in the Turks and Caicos Islands. Two co-defendants were also convicted. McAllister Hanchell, the former Minister of Natural Resources, was found guilty on two counts of bribery. Thomas Chalmers Misick, Michael Misick’s brother and a local attorney, was convicted on four counts of money laundering for assisting in concealing and disguising the proceeds of bribery.

All three were granted bail pending sentencing, set for May 2026, with strict conditions preventing them from leaving the islands. The court is also expected to rule on confiscation orders covering properties valued at approximately US$25 million.

At the heart of the case were corrupt payments exceeding US$20 million, channelled through complex multinational company structures and hidden international bank transfers. Prosecutors described a pattern of unlawful inducements paid by developers in exchange for favourable government decisions relating to Crown land, zoning, and major tourism projects.

The schemes, the land, and the money

The bribery schemes centred on some of the most valuable undeveloped land in Turks and Caicos. Salt Cay developments accounted for roughly US$14.2 million in corrupt payments. West Caicos developments were linked to approximately US$4.7 million. Transactions involving the Beaches resort group accounted for a further US$2 million.

Misick was convicted of accepting inducements between 2006 and 2008 from developers connected to the Logwood Development Company and related entities. These inducements took many forms including cash, credit, entertainment, and other advantages. In return, he acted in ways that breached the standards of honesty and integrity expected of a Minister of the Crown.

Hanchell was convicted of accepting similar inducements in connection with land deals on both Salt Cay and West Caicos. One strand of the case also involved payments linked to businessman Mario Hoffman.

Thomas Misick’s role was different in form and critical in effect. The court found that between 2003 and 2009 he assisted in concealing and disguising the proceeds of criminal conduct, knowing or having reasonable grounds to suspect that the funds represented the proceeds of bribery committed by his brother. This included structuring transactions and moving funds through accounts in ways designed to frustrate detection and confiscation.

The wider scandal and earlier convictions

Michael Misick served as premier from 2006 until 2009. His resignation followed a British Commission of Inquiry that found clear signs of systemic corruption, particularly involving Crown land and development approvals. The findings were so serious that the UK imposed direct rule on the territory for a period.

In response, the Special Investigation and Prosecution Team was established in 2010. Charges were first laid in 2011, though legal challenges, procedural hearings, extradition issues, and judicial changes delayed a full trial for many years.

Misick himself was arrested in Brazil in 2012 and extradited to the Turks and Caicos Islands. The overall case was repeatedly split due to plea deals, the withdrawal or death of defendants, and the death of the original trial judge in 2021.

Earlier proceedings concluded in September 2023 with convictions for former ministers Floyd Hall and Clayton Greene on bribery and money laundering charges. The 2026 verdicts therefore sit within a much broader pattern of confirmed corruption at the highest levels of government during that period.

The red flags that were ignored

From a compliance and risk perspective, the Misick case contains almost every major red flag firms are trained to look for.

  • A senior foreign public official with direct control over state assets.
  • Repeated interactions with developers seeking favourable treatment.
  • Payments routed through complex corporate structures.
  • Use of family members and professional advisers to move and conceal funds.
  • Cross-border transactions involving multiple jurisdictions and banks.

Bribery risk, foreign officials, and why PEPs are always high risk

Michael Misick was a politically exposed person. As premier of an overseas territory, he exercised significant influence over land allocation, planning approvals, and development policy. That influence created an inherent corruption risk that should have triggered enhanced due diligence by any firm dealing with him, his close associates, or entities linked to his office.

Foreign officials and PEPs require enhanced scrutiny

PEPs are not high risk because they are more likely to commit crimes. They are high risk because their position allows them to direct public resources, influence decisions, and create value for third parties. That combination attracts bribery attempts. Enhanced due diligence should include deeper source of wealth checks, scrutiny of business rationale, and ongoing monitoring for unusual payments or changes in behaviour.

Close associates matter as much as the official

Thomas Misick was not the premier, yet his conviction shows how family members and advisers can play a decisive role in laundering proceeds of corruption. Effective onboarding must extend beyond the named counterparty to beneficial owners, controllers, and close associates. Ignoring these links creates blind spots that criminals are happy to exploit.

Complex structures and cross-border payments amplify risk

The use of multinational company structures and international bank transfers was central to this case. Complexity is not proof of wrongdoing, though it is often used to obscure it. Where complexity intersects with PEP exposure, the risk profile increases sharply. Firms should be especially cautious where there is no clear commercial rationale for offshore entities, layered ownership, or rapid movement of funds across jurisdictions.

Time does not eliminate corruption risk

Many of the offences occurred more than fifteen years before conviction. The long delay did not reduce the seriousness of the conduct or the consequences for those involved. From a compliance perspective, this reinforces the importance of record-keeping, historical due diligence, and understanding that enforcement often moves slowly.

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