UK Government outlines proposed changes to competition and markets regime

Published in January 2026, the UK Government’s Refining Our Competition Regime sets out proposals to reshape merger control, market investigations and the internal governance of the Competition and Markets Authority. The consultation runs until 31 March 2026 and signals a likely legislative change from late 2026 onwards. We may see proposals in the May 2026 Kings Speech.

Change has been on the agenda for some time. Businesses, advisers and investors have increasingly described UK merger control as unpredictable and procedurally onerous, particularly when compared with EU and US counterparts. This consultation attempts to deliver improvements through a refined UK competition regime and a decisive attempt to rebalance the system.

From independence to accountability in Phase 2 decisions

One of the most significant proposals concerns how in-depth Phase 2 merger decisions are made. The UK’s long-standing model relies on independent CMA panels, drawn from a roster of external experts, to take over from the Phase 1 case team. This separation has been defended as a safeguard of independence and fresh scrutiny. The Government now questions whether that model still serves its purpose.

Under the proposals, Phase 2 merger decisions and major market review decisions would move to sub-committees of the CMA Board. These would include senior CMA executives, non-executive directors and externally appointed experts. The stated aim is greater accountability and consistency. Ministers argue that the individuals ultimately accountable to Parliament for the CMA’s performance should also be directly responsible for its most consequential decisions.

Decisions may become more aligned with published strategic steers, industrial policy and growth priorities. That may improve predictability at a macro level. It also increases the importance of understanding the CMA’s institutional incentives, not just the legal test. At the same time, the proposals leave appeals confined to judicial review, with no move towards merits-based review. That combination increases the premium on early engagement, evidence quality and procedural discipline during investigations.

Jurisdiction clarified, but not constrained

Few aspects of UK merger control generate as much compliance uncertainty as jurisdiction. The CMA’s share of supply test and the low threshold of material influence have allowed them to review transactions with limited UK nexus, including minority investments. The Government accepts that this flexibility has become difficult for businesses to navigate.

The consultation proposes statutory “closed lists” for both tests. For share of supply, the CMA would be limited to assessing value, cost, price, quantity, capacity and number of workers. For material influence, the list would include shareholding thresholds, board representation, veto rights, access to confidential information and commercial arrangements.

In theory, this should improve clarity. In practice, compliance teams should be cautious about over-interpreting the change. The lists remain broad, and the inclusion of factors such as workforce numbers signals that the Government has no intention of moving to a narrow, market-definition-based jurisdictional test. Minority investments, strategic partnerships and structured collaborations will continue to sit within scope where influence can be inferred. Internal deal screening and escalation processes should therefore remain conservative, even as statutory language tightens.

More time for remedies

The proposal to extend the Phase 1 remedies window from ten to twenty working days is modest on its face. Its significance lies in what it says about regulatory posture. The Government wants fewer deals pushed into Phase 2 where competition concerns can be resolved proportionately and quickly.

This creates both opportunity and risk. Early remedies discussions will become more important, and potentially more substantive. That requires organisations to have credible remedy options prepared at speed, supported by clean data and governance sign-off. It also reinforces the need for competition compliance to be embedded into transaction planning, not treated as a late-stage legal exercise.

A faster, single-stage markets regime

Market investigations are among the CMA’s most powerful tools, and among the most disruptive for businesses. The current two-stage process of market studies followed by market investigations can run for more than three years. The Government proposes replacing this with a single-stage market review capped at 24 months, with remedies developed and implemented within that window.

A single-stage process means earlier exposure to compulsory information gathering and earlier signalling of potential remedies. The consultation also raises the possibility of moving to a single legal test focused on adverse effects on consumers rather than competition alone. That would widen the lens through which corporate conduct is assessed, pulling in pricing practices, transparency and fairness concerns that may previously have sat outside traditional competition analysis.

The quiet revolution in remedies governance

One of the least headline-grabbing proposals may have the most lasting impact. The Government intends to make sunset clauses the default for market remedies and to require formal reviews at least every ten years. This follows decades in which some remedies remained in force indefinitely, long after markets had evolved.

For organisations subject to legacy remedies, this is potentially transformative. Compliance teams should expect increased scrutiny of whether existing obligations remain justified. At the same time, future remedies are likely to be designed with an explicit expiry horizon, changing how compliance programmes plan for long-term operational constraints. Remedy monitoring will become more dynamic, with periodic reassessment baked into the system rather than treated as an exceptional event.

Algorithms, data and investigatory reach

The consultation also reflects a growing regulatory concern with algorithmic decision-making. The CMA would gain explicit powers to require demonstrations, simulations and behavioural testing of algorithms across competition and consumer protection investigations.

This reinforces the convergence between competition compliance, data governance and AI risk management. Organisations will need to ensure they can explain how algorithms operate, what data they rely on and how outcomes are controlled. Technical opacity will no longer be a defensible position in regulatory engagement.

A more political role for guidance

Finally, the proposal to give the Secretary of State a formal role in approving a wider range of CMA guidance documents represents a significant shift in governance. While the Government emphasises that enforcement independence will remain intact, guidance increasingly shapes how businesses assess risk and design compliance programmes. Specific political oversight of that guidance introduces a new variable into compliance planning, particularly in high risk areas or those likely to trigger an adverse political viewpoint.

In 2025 the Competition and Markets Authority cleared every merger it reviewed, a remarkable outcome that followed sustained pressure from government to align competition enforcement with a pro-growth agenda, and included the replacement of the CMA’s chair amid concerns that the regulator was perceived as an obstacle to investment and expansion. That backdrop has sharpened questions about how political expectations and media narratives can influence competition outcomes and the culture within the CMA itself.

This means recognising that competition enforcement does not operate in a vacuum. High-profile transactions and market interventions now unfold in a crowded media environment, where narratives around consumer harm, pricing, jobs and national competitiveness can gain momentum quickly. Political attention often follows that coverage, and regulators are rarely immune to the broader context in which their decisions are made. 

Compliance teams should therefore factor reputational exposure and public messaging into competition risk assessments, especially for deals or practices that could attract public controversy. Anticipating how a transaction might be framed by commentators, campaigners or policymakers, and ensuring that internal decision-making, documentation and external communications can withstand that scrutiny, is increasingly part of effective competition compliance rather than a separate public affairs concern.

What compliance teams should take from this

The CMA retains broad jurisdiction, strong investigatory powers and a voluntary notification system. What could change is the context in which those powers are exercised.

Competition risk should not be managed purely through legal analysis at the point of enforcement. It demands earlier governance engagement, clearer internal accountability for strategic decisions, and closer alignment between compliance, transactions, data and technology functions.

Consider responding to the consultation
Decide whether to submit a formal response or at least run an internal review against the consultation questions.

Map exposure under the proposed regime
Identify where your organisation relies on minority investments, strategic partnerships, joint ventures or acquisitions with limited UK nexus, as these remain squarely in scope despite the proposed clarifications.

Prepare for earlier and more intensive engagement
Expect more emphasis on early remedies discussions, faster market reviews and closer scrutiny of internal decision-making. Competition compliance should be embedded earlier in deal planning and strategic initiatives.

Review governance and documentation discipline
Board papers, investment committee minutes and internal risk assessments should clearly evidence how competition risks are identified, assessed and mitigated, particularly in politically or media-sensitive transactions.

Assess legacy remedies and ongoing obligations
If the business is subject to market remedies, start planning for future reviews and potential sunset clauses. Be ready to demonstrate whether obligations remain necessary and proportionate.

Strengthen algorithm and data readiness
Ensure the organisation can explain how key algorithms operate, what data they rely on and how outcomes are controlled, given the proposed expansion of CMA investigatory powers.

Factor in political and reputational risk
Build media and political sensitivity into competition risk assessments. Transactions that attract public attention may face a different regulatory dynamic even where the legal analysis appears finely balanced.